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SMALE STRATEGIES FOR THE
N-PERSON ITERATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA
ETHAN AKIN, SLAWOMIR PLASKACZ, AND JOANNA ZWIERZCHOWSKA
Abstract. Adapting methods introduced by Steven Smale, we
describe good strategies for a symmetric version of the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with n players.
1. Introduction
In [5] Smale introduced an approach to strategy for the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma which was different from the popular Markov chain
methods. He suggested using as data the current time average payoff
to the players rather than using the results of the most recent round of
play. Smale’s results were extended in [1]. Here we apply these methods
to a symmetric n player version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The goal is
to describe good plans which stabilize the cooperative outcome where
each player receives (in long-term average) the payoff pn obtained when
all n players cooperate. A strategy is a choice of initial play together
with a plan responding to previous play.
We describe good plans with the following properties.
• If all n players eventually use good plans, then from any initial
position, convergence to cooperation is achieved.
• Suppose that for some k with 1 ≤ k < n, players j with
j = 1, . . . , k eventually use good plans and suppose that X =
(x1, . . . , xk, zk+1, . . . , zn) is a limit point for the sequence of
time averages of the payoffs. Let x¯ be the mean of the good
player payoffs and z¯ the mean of the remaining, dissenting,
player payoffs. The only way it can occur that z¯ ≥ pn is if
X = (pn, . . . , pn), i.e. the cooperative payoff. Otherwise, while
z¯ > x¯, i.e. on average the dissenters do better than the good
players, their average payoff remains below pn.
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If k < n−1 it may happen that, while the mean z¯ < pn, some
of the dissenters do get a payoff larger than pn. However, if
zk+1 ≥ pn, then if z˜ is the mean of the remaining dissenters, i.e.
the average of zk+2, . . . , zn then z˜ < x¯. That is, the remaining
players on average do worse than the good players and thus it
pays for some of them to switch to good plans.
Smale strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with n players
were described by Behrstock, Benaim and Hirsch in [2]. There is over-
lap between our results and theirs, but because they were considering
a variety of cases, their exposition is more complicated. Markov strate-
gies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with n players were described
in [3] and [4].
2. The Game
We consider an n-player symmetric game. Each player has a choice of
two strategies c or d (cooperate or defect). When no players cooperate,
each obtains a payoff r0 and when all n players cooperate, each obtains
pn. For k = 1, . . . , n − 1 when k players cooperate, each cooperator
receives pk and each defector receives rk.
Our first assumption is monotonicity of the payoffs.
(2.1) r0 < r1 < · · · < rn−1, and p1 < p2 < · · · < pn.
That is, the payoffs to both defectors and cooperators increase as the
number of cooperators increase.
Our second assumption concerns the advantage of defection.
(2.2) For k = 1, . . . , n, pk < rk−1.
This says that any cooperator would do better by switching to defec-
tion, provided the choices of the other players remain fixed. Thus, the
strategy of defection dominates cooperation regardless of the choices
of the other players.
For our third assumption, we define the population mean payoff, or
just mean payoff, mk by
m0 = r0, mn = pn,
mk =
1
n
[k · pk + (n− k) · rk] for k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
(2.3)
From (2.1) and (2.2) it is clear than
(2.4) pk < mk < rk for k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
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Our third assumption is monotonicity of the mean payoffs.
(2.5) m0 < m1 < · · · < mn−1 < mn.
If there are currently k − 1 cooperators and one defector switches to
cooperation, then he bears a cost of rk−1 − pk. This assumption says
that the aggregate increase to the other players exceeds this cost, i.e.
r0 − p1 < (n− 1) · (r1 − r0), rn−1 − pn < (n− 1) · (pn − pn−1),
rk−1 − pk < (k − 1) · [(pk−pk−1) + (n− k) · (rk − rk−1)],
for k = 2, . . . , n− 1.
(2.6)
In the case when n = 2 the game is the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In the notation of [1]
(2.7) r0 = P, r1 = T, p1 = S, p2 = R,
with the assumptions
(2.8) S < P <
1
2
(T + S) < R < T.
Example 2.1. The values (p1, r0, p2, r1, . . . ) = (0, 1, 2, 3, . . . ) for n ≥ 2
is an example.
Proof: pk = 2k − 2, rk = 2k + 1 and so
n·mk = kpk+(n−k)rk = k(2k−2)+(n−k)(2k+1) = (2n−3)k+n.
Thus,
(2.9) mk = (2−
3
n
)k + 1.
which is positive and increasing in k for n ≥ 2.
✷
3. The Outcome and Strategy Regions
We consider repeated play. After the T th round the payoff to the
n players is a vector ST in Rn. There are 2n possible payoff vectors
according to the choices made by the players. For example, if in round
T a single player cooperated, then the vector ST has a single entry p1
and n-1 entries r1. There are n such payoff vectors according to which
player cooperated.
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For a single payoff after T rounds we use the time-average of the
payoff vectors:
(3.1) sT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
St.
Observe that
(3.2) sT+1 =
T
T + 1
sT +
1
T + 1
ST+1.
and so
(3.3) sT+1 − sT =
1
T + 1
(ST+1 − sT ).
The sequence {sT} lies in the outcome set O ⊂ Rn which is a convex
hull of the 2n payoff vectors. The sequence need not converge in O
but the set Ω of limit points is always a nonempty, compact, connected
subset of O, see, e.g. [1] Proposition 2.1.
The approach introduced by Smale in [5] is for each player to use
the current time average sT as data in order to determine his choice in
round T + 1. In this case, the symmetry of the game suggests that it
would be sufficient for each player to keep track of how he is doing and
to compare it merely with the time average of the mean payoff. That
is, define π¯ : Rn → R by π¯(x1, . . . , xn) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 xj . For player j the
linear map Πj = πj × π¯ : R
n → R2 maps the outcome set O onto the
strategy set S ⊂ R2 which is the convex hull of the set of 2n points
(3.4) {(r0, r0), (pn, pn)} ∪ {(pk, mk), (rk, mk) : k = 1, . . . , n− 1}
Thus, Πj maps s
T to a pair (x, y) ∈ R2 with x the j player’s current
average payoff and with y the current average population mean.
Notice that from (2.5) and convexity it follows that (r0, r0) is the
unique point of S with y coordinate less than or equal to r0 and (pn, pn)
is the unique point of S with y coordinate greater than or equal to pn.
Hence, these two points are extreme points of S.
We will call {(pk, mk) : k = 1, . . . , n} the cooperation points and
{(rk, mk) : k = 0, . . . , n− 1} the defection points of S.
Definition 3.1. For a line ℓ in R2 with equation y = λx+b we call the
map L : R2 → R given by (x, y) 7→ y−λx−b the associated affine map.
We call ℓ a separation line for the game if each cooperation point is
on or above ℓ and each defection point is on or below ℓ, i.e. L is non-
negative on the cooperation points and non-positive on the defection
points.
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Proposition 3.2. If a line ℓ with equation y = λx+ b is a separation
line, then 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and if n > 2 then 0 < λ.
Proof: By the Intermediate Value Theorem, a separation line inter-
sects the intervals [(p1, m1), (r0, r0)] and [(pn, pn), (rn−1, mn−1)]. Hence,
the steepest possible separation line connects (r0, r0) and (pn, pn) with
slope 1. On the other hand, the slope must be at most that of the line
connecting (p1, m1) with (rn−1, mn−1). This line has positive slope if
n > 2 and slope 0 if n = 2.
✷
We will call the line through (r0, r0) and (pn, pn) the diagonal line or
just the diagonal. It is the line with equation y = x and is the unique
separation line with slope equal to 1.
All our results are based on the following.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that X is a limit point of the sequence {sT},
i.e. X ∈ Ω ⊂ O. Let ℓ be a line in R2 with finite slope.
(a) Assume that every defection point lies on or below ℓ. If from
some time onward, player j defects whenever Πj(s
T ) lies above ℓ, then
Πj(X) lies on or below ℓ.
(b) Assume that every cooperation point lies on or above ℓ. If from
some time onward, player j cooperates whenever Πj(s
T ) lies below ℓ,
then Πj(X) lies on or above ℓ.
Proof: Assume that y = λx + b is the equation of ℓ and that L is
the associated affine map. Let M be a positive number greater than
the maximum of L on S.
(a) Assume that after some time T0 ≥ 1 player j defects when
L(Πj(s
T )) > 0. Let M0 = T0 · M . We show that for all T ≥ T0,
L(Πj(s
T )) ≤M0/T . We proceed by induction. Observe that the result
holds for T = T0.
If L(Πj(s
T )) > 0 then player j defects on the next round and so
L(Πj(S
T+1)) ≤ 0. Hence, because L is an affine map, (3.2) implies
that
L(Πj(s
T+1)) =
T
T + 1
L(Πj(s
T )) +
1
T + 1
L(Πj(S
T+1))
≤
T
T + 1
L(Πj(s
T )) ≤
T
T + 1
M0/T =M0/(T + 1),
(3.5)
by induction hypothesis.
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On the other hand, if L(Πj(s
T )) ≤ 0
L(Πj(s
T+1)) =
T
T + 1
L(Πj(s
T )) +
1
T + 1
L(Πj(S
T+1))
≤
1
T + 1
L(Πj(S
T+1)) ≤
1
T + 1
M ≤M0/(T + 1).
(3.6)
It follows that lim sup{L(Πj(s
T ))} ≤ 0 and so any limit point lies on
or below ℓ.
(b) The proof is completely analogous and left to the reader. It is
convenient to use −L instead of L.
✷
4. Simple Smale Plan
Definition 4.1. Let ℓ be a separation line for the game with positive
slope. The simple Smale plan for player j defects on round T +1 when
Πj(s
T ) is above ℓ and cooperates when Πj(s
T ) is on or below ℓ.
We use the term “plan” because a strategy includes a choice of initial
play as well as a plan responding to previous outcomes. Observe that
the demand that the slope be positive is automatically satisfied if n > 2
by Proposition 3.2.
We will say that a player eventually uses a simple Smale plan when
there is a fixed simple Smale plan which is used by the player from
some time onward.
Theorem 4.2. Let Ω be the set of limit points of the sequence {sT}.
If player j eventually uses the simple Smale plan with separation line
ℓ, then Πj(Ω) ⊂ ℓ.
Proof: This immediately follows from Proposition 3.3.
✷
Corollary 4.3. For j = 1, . . . , n let ℓj be a separation line with positive
slope and assume that at least one has slope less than 1. There exists
a unique point X ∈ O such that if each player j eventually uses the
simple Smale plan associated with ℓj, then the sequence {s
T} converges
in O to X.
If each ℓj passes through (pn, pn), then X = (pn, . . . , pn) and so we
obtain convergence to the position of complete cooperation.
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Proof: Since line ℓj has positive slope we can write its equation
as y = λj(x − aj). Now let (x1, . . . , xn) be an arbitrary limit point
of the sequence {sT}. If player j uses the ℓj strategy, then with x¯ =
π¯(x1, . . . , xn) Theorem 4.2 implies that (xj, x¯) = Πj(x1, . . . , xn) lies on
ℓj and so x¯ = λj(xj − aj).
If this holds for all j then (λj)
−1x¯ = xj − aj. Let a¯ = π¯(a1, . . . , an)
and let λˆ be the harmonic mean of the λj’s, i.e.
λˆ = [π¯((λ1)
−1, . . . , (λn)
−1)]−1. It is clear that x¯ = λˆ(x¯− a¯). Since not
all the λj = 1, Proposition 3.2 implies that 0 < λˆ < 1 and so the line
y = λˆ(x − a¯) intersects the line y = x at a unique point (x¯, x¯). That
is, the mean, x¯, is determined by the lines ℓj. Since x¯ = λj(xj − aj),
all of the xj ’s are determined as well.
Thus, the limit point X = (x1, . . . , xn) is uniquely determined by
the equations x¯ = λˆ(x¯− a¯) and x¯ = λj(xj − aj) for j = 1, . . . , n.
Since the sequence {sT} has a unique limit point, compactness im-
plies convergence.
Now assume that (pn, pn) ∈ ℓj for all j. Hence, (λj)
−1pn = pn − aj
for all j and so, averaging, we have pn = λˆ(pn − a¯). Uniqueness in
the above argument implies x¯ = pn. The point X = (pn, . . . , pn) is the
unique point of O with π¯(X) = pn.
✷
Remark: We can characterize the limit point (x1, . . . , xn) as follows.
It is the unique point such that there exists y ∈ R so that Xk =
(xk, y) ∈ ℓk and X¯ =
1
n
∑n
k=1Xk is on the diagonal line with y = x.
Definition 4.4. Let ℓ be a separation line with positive slope. We call
simple Smale plan a good simple Smale plan when it is associated with
a separation line ℓ which passes through (pn, pn) and which has slope λ
satisfying n−1
n
< λ < 1.
That is, the equation of a separation line for a good simple Smale
plan can be written pn − y = λ(pn − x) with
n−1
n
< λ < 1.
It follows from Corollary 4.3 that if each player eventually uses a
good simple Smale plan then we achieve convergence to complete co-
operation. Smale calls this stability. However, we are also interested in
what happens when only some of the players are good.
Suppose that for j = 1, . . . , k player j uses a good simple Smale plan
associated with separation line ℓj having slope λj. Suppose further that
X = (x1, . . . , xk, zk+1, . . . , zn) is a limit point for {s
T}. We assume that
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1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. We will call the players j with j = k + 1, . . . , n the
dissenting players.
Define
x¯ =
1
k
k∑
j=1
xj, z¯ =
1
n− k
n∑
j=k+1
zj ,
y =
1
n
[
k∑
j=1
xj +
n∑
j=k+1
zj ] =
1
n
[kx¯+ (n− k)z¯],
λˆ = [
1
k
k∑
j=1
(λj)
−1)]−1.
(4.1)
Thus, x¯ is the mean payoff among the good players, z¯ is the mean
payoff among the dissenters and y is the mean for the entire population.
From Theorem 4.2 it follows that (xj , y) = Πj(X) ∈ ℓj and so pn −
y = λj(pn−xj) for j = 1, . . . , k. Dividing by λj and averaging as before
we obtain pn − y = λˆ(pn − x¯). Hence,
(4.2)
1
n
[k(pn − x¯) + (n− k)(pn − z¯)] = λˆ(pn − x¯).
We can rewrite this as
(n− k)(pn − z¯) = (nλˆ− k)(pn − x¯), and
z¯ = x¯+
n(1− λˆ)
n− k
(pn − x¯)
(4.3)
Now assume that k ≤ n − 2 and suppose that zk+1 ≥ pn and so
pn − zk+1 ≤ 0. Define
(4.4) z˜ =
1
n− k − 1
n∑
j=k+2
zj .
So we have
(4.5)
1
n
[k(pn − x¯) + (n− k − 1)(pn − z˜)] ≥ λˆ(pn − x¯).
We can rewrite this as
(4.6) z˜ ≤ x¯−
1− n(1− λˆ)
n− k − 1
(pn − x¯).
Now we apply all this.
Theorem 4.5. With 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, assume that players j = 1, . . . , k
eventually play good simple Smale plans. For a limit point X =
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(x1, . . . , xk, zk+1, . . . , zn) let x¯ be the mean payoff among the good play-
ers and let z¯ be the mean payoff among the dissenting players. If
z¯ ≥ pn, then X = (pn, . . . , pn) the complete cooperation point. Oth-
erwise, x¯ < z¯ < pn. In particular, if k = n− 1 then zn ≥ pn only when
X = (pn, . . . , pn).
Now assume that k ≤ n − 2. If zk+1 ≥ pn and z˜ is the mean payoff
among the remaining dissenting players, then either X = (pn, . . . , pn)
or x¯ > z˜.
Proof: Because the strategies are assumed to be good simple Smale
plans, it follows that 1 > λˆ > n−1
n
. Hence, nλˆ− k > 0. It follows from
(4.3) that if z¯ ≥ pn, then x¯ ≥ pn. So y ≥ pn and this implies X is the
cooperation point. From the second equation in (4.3) we see that the
dissenters on average do better than the good players but not as well
as if they switched to cooperation and achieved the pn payoff.
If there is a single dissenter, player n then z¯ = zn and so zn ≥ pn
only when X = (pn, . . . , pn).
The second result follows from (4.6) because 1− n(1− λˆ) > 0.
✷
Thus, if even one player uses a good simple Smale plan and the
dissenting players do not allow the group to reach the cooperation
point, then on average they do worse than the pn payoff although they
do better than the good players.
With z¯ < pn it may still happen that some among the dissenters
can reach a payoff of pn or greater. However if this happens then the
remaining dissenters on average do worse than the good players and so
it pays for some of them to switch to a good simple Smale plan. That
is, at least one of the remaining dissenters would do better by switching
to a good simple Smale plan.
The case of a dissenter obtaining a payoff greater than pn can happen.
It seems to require exploiting naive behavior by the other dissenters.
Here is an extreme case.
Example 4.6. With n ≥ 3, if, from some time on, player k for
k = 1, . . . , n − 2 always cooperates, and player n always defects, then
player n always receives a payoff between rn−2 and rn−1 regardless of
the behavior of player n− 1, e.g. even if player n− 1 uses a good sim-
ple Smale strategy. In particular, if rn−2 > pn, then player n always
receives a payoff greater than pn.
If, in addition, player n− 1 eventually uses a simple Smale strategy
then we obtain convergence to a unique point X regardless of the early
plays.
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Proof: The strategies All−C and All−D, always cooperating and
always defecting, respectively, trivially include Smale plans. If players
1, . . . , n− 2 always use All−C and player n always uses All−D, then
every outcome ST ∈ O is either V0 = (pn−2, . . . , pn−2, rn−2, rn−2) or V1 =
(pn−1, . . . , pn−1, pn−1, rn−1), depending whether player n− 1 defects or
cooperates. It follows that every average point sT lies on the segment
between them, which we parameterize by Va = V0 + a(V1 − V0) for
0 ≤ a ≤ 1. If the strategies All−C and All−D are only adopted after
some time T0, the effect of the initial terms on the average sequence
{sT} tends to 0 as T → ∞ and so in any case, the limit set Ω is
contained in the segment [V0, V1]. So for any X ∈ Ω, πn(X) ≥ rn−2.
The line δ through Πn−1([V0, V1]) = [(rn−2, mn−2), (pn−1, mn−1)] has
negative slope. As a separation line ℓ has positive slope it follows that
δ ∩ ℓ is a single point. Thus, Π−1n−1(ℓ) is a hyperplane in R
n which
intersects [V0, V1] in a unique point X . By Theorem 4.2 Ω = {X} and
so we have convergence to X .
✷
In the above example, suppose ℓλ is a separation line through (pn, pn)
with equation y− pn = λ(x− pn) so that λ ≤ 1. We then let Xλ = Vaλ
denote the intersection point with the line δ. The value aλ is obtained
by solving the equation π¯(Va)− pn = λ(πn−1(Va)− pn).
In the special case λ = 1, ℓ1 is the diagonal with equation y = x and
so a1 satisfies
(4.7) mn−2 + a1(mn−1 −mn−2) = rn−2 + a1(pn−1 − rn−2).
That is, a1 equals
(4.8)
rn−2 −mn−2
(mn−1 −mn−2) + (rn−2 − pn−1)
=
rn−2 −mn−2
(rn−2 −mn−2) + (mn−1 − pn−1)
Thus, πn(X1) = rn−2 + a1(rn−1 − rn−2) ≥ pn when a1 · rn−1 + (1 −
a1) · rn−2 ≥ pn.
If λ < 1, then ℓλ intersects δ between Va1 and V1. So if λ < 1, then
aλ > a1. Because πn(Va) is increasing in a, we see that
(4.9) λ < 1 =⇒ πn(Xλ) > πn(X1).
With n = 3, (p1, r0, p2, p3, r1, r2) = (0, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8) provides an ex-
ample with r1 > p3, since 3(m0, m1, m2, m3) = (6, 14, 16, 18). Thus, if
player 1 always cooperates and player 3 always defects, then player 3
receives a payoff of at least 7 > 6 regardless of the behavior of player
2.
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Even without the rn−2 > pn assumption, it can happen that a dis-
senter obtains greater than pn even when one of the other players uses
a good, simple, Smale plan.
Example 4.7. Assume that for n ≥ 3, (p1, r0, p2, r1, . . . ) = (0, 1, 2, 3, . . . )
as in Example 2.1. If, eventually, player k for k = 1, . . . , n− 2 always
cooperates, player n − 1 uses a good, simple Smale plan and player n
always defects, then there is a unique limit point X = (x1, . . . , xn) with
xn > pn = 2n− 2.
Proof: In this case, we have
πj(Va) = 2n− 6 + 2a = 2n− 3 + (2a− 3) for j = 1, . . . , n− 2,
πn−1(Va) = 2n− 3− a, πn(Va) = 2n− 3 + 2a,
π¯(Va) = 2n− 3 +
1
n
[a(2n− 3)− 3(n− 2)].
(4.10)
Equating πn−1(Va) = π¯(Va) to solve for a1 we obtain a1 =
n−2
n−1
. Hence,
(4.11) πn(X1) = 2n− 3 + 2a1 = 2n− 2 +
n− 3
n− 1
.
Since pn = 2n − 2, (4.11) and (4.9) imply πn(Xλ) > πn(X1) ≥ pn
with the latter inequality strict if n > 3. Recall that for a good, simple
Smale plan, the separation line passes through (pn, pn) and has slope
less than 1.
✷
Remark: In the above example with n = 3 we easily see that if
player 2 uses the simple Smale plan with separation line the diagonal,
i.e. λ = 1, then a1 =
1
2
and the payoff vector is X1 = (1, 2.5, 4)
when player 1 uses All − C and player 3 uses All − D. In general,
if player 2 uses the diagonal simple Smale plan, then no player can
obtain a payoff greater than 4 = p3, the cooperative payoff. For if X =
(x1, x2, x3) is a limit point then Π2(X) = (x2, x¯) lies on the diagonal
by Theorem 4.2 and so x2 = x¯. This implies that x¯ =
1
2
(x1 + x3).
Observe that Π1(X) = (x1, x¯) ∈ Π1(O) = S
′ which is the convex hull
of {(1, 1), (0, 2), (3, 2), (2, 3), (5, 3), (4, 4)}. It follows that x1 ≥ 2x¯ − 4.
Thus, x3 = 2x¯− x1 ≤ 4.
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